found that the level of the spread will be positively related to the debt/GNP ratio and the debt service ratio. On the other hand, the spread will be negatively related to the international reserves to GNP ratio and the propensity to invest. The results obtained also show that an increase in the foreign debt coupled with an equivalent increase in international reserves will tend to leave the perceived probability of default unaffected. The empirical analysis presented in this paper also indicates that as late as 1980 the international financial community had not perceived any significant increase in the probabilities of defaulting in the countries that eventually run into serious debt problems (i.e
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Financial support from UCLA'S Council on International and Comparative Studies, is gratefully acknowledged. I have benefited from helpful discussions with John Bilson and Carlos Rodriguez, and from conmients by Michael Darby, Susan Woodward and the participants of the Money Workshop at UCLA. Steve Feinstein and Evan Tanner provided able research assistance. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The recent foreign debt crisis faced by some less developed countries (LDC'S) -i.e.,, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina -has generated concern among economists, bankers and politicians. In particular, the ability of the international banks to distinguish between "good' and "bad" risks has been questioned. It has even been suggested that the inability to restrict credit to countries with low "credit worthiness" has resulted in the overextension of some major banks and that, as a consequence, this has increased the probability of a global international financial collapse.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the international financial community has taken into account the risk characteristics of borrowing less developed countries when granting loans. Specifically, this study analyzes the determinants of the spread between the interest rate charged to a particular country and the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) . If the financial community distinguishes between countries with different probabilities of..default, these perceptions will be reflected in the spreads over LIBOR, with riskier countries (i.e., countries with a higher probability of default) being charged a higher risk premium or spread. When the perceived probability of default exceeds a given level, however, that particular country will be completely excluded from the credit market (Eaton and Gerowitz 1980, l98la,b; Sachs and Cohen 1982, Folkers-Landau 1982 .)
The empirical analysis of the determinants of the default risk premium is important for several reasons. First, an understanding of the factors that influence lending behavior, is useful for borrowing countries. With this knowledge LDCs can take positive steps towards managing their economies in a way such that the perceived default risk is kept at a level compatible with what lenders think is prudent. Second, additional information on how the market assesses default risk will be helpful for determining the probability that the present repayment difficulties faced by some LDC's can be transformed into a major global crisis. Also, this analysis will provide insights on the international banks lending behavior, that will be helpful to assess to what extent they have been (partially) responsible for the present debt crisis.
And third, empirical information on the relationship between the level of the foreign debt and its cost is useful for the analysis of optimal borrowing strategies and of the social rate of discount in an open economy.2
A number of papers have recently analyzed the theoretical determinants of default country risk.3 Early studies (i.e., Bardhan, 1967) mainly focused on the relationship between the level of foreign debt and the cost of foreign borrowing, trying to define "optimal" borrowing strategies. More recent work, however, has expanded the analysis in several directions: First, the existence of credit ceilings, above which countries cannot borrow, has been explicItly introduced into the analysis (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1980 , 1981a ,b, Sachs and Cohen, 1982 and Folkerts-Landau 1982 .) Second, variables other than the level of foreign debt have been explicitly considered as affecting the default risk premium. In particular, it has been argued that in a general equilibrium framework the level of international reserves will be related to the level of debt, and thus could affect the level of default risk (Feder and Just, 1979; Eaton and Cersowitz, 1980, 1981a) . Also it has been pointed out that the propensity to invest will be negatively related to the risk premiums. The reason for this is that a higher propensity to invest will generally indicate a higher potential for future growth, and thus, a lower probability of default (Sachs and Cohen, 1982) . Third it has been argued that the current account will affect the default premium (Sachs, 1981; Sachs and Cohen, 1982) .
Recent theoretical analyses have also made a distinction between bond and bank foreign financing, and have explicitly Introduced the possibility of rescheduling debt payments (Sachs and Cohen, 1982; Sachs, l982) . Finally, it has been argued that if borrowers and lenders have different perceptions with respect to the probability of default, the analysis of optimal borrowing strategies would be substantially affected (I-Iarberger, 1976a (I-Iarberger, ,b, 1980 .
The empirical work on the subject has investigated several aspects of the problem, including the probability of a country rescheduling its payments (Frank and Cline, 1971; Sargen, 1977) , and the probability that a particular LDC borrower has reached its credit ceiling (Eaton and Cersowitz, 1980, 1981a,b) . Generally, those studies that have analyzed lending behavior in international financial markets have found that lenders tend to take into account the riskiness of borrowers in making their lending decisions (Frank and Cline, 1971; Feder and Just, 1977a,b; Feder and Ross, 1982; Sachs, 1981) . In particular, it has been found that the interest rate spread, or risk premium, will be higher for countries with a higher foreign debt ratio (Frank and Cline, 1971; Feder and Just, 1977; Sachs, 1981) . Moreover, in a recent paper, Feder and Ross (1982) used data from the Institutional Investor creditworthiness ranking to show that lenders risk perceptions are systematically reflected in the spreads charged in Euromarkets. Also, this study shows that the expected losses lenders expect to incur in case of default are quite low --typically between 4 and 7 percent.
The analysis presented in this paper extends previous work on the subject
In several directions. First, while most of the previous work used crosssection data for a particular year or quarter, the present study covers several years (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) . Second, the sample considered in this paper only includes loans denominated in Eurodollars, thus avoiding the problem of different currency composition of loans, mentioned by McDonald (1982, p. 630) . Also this paper only includes public and publically guaranteed loans, thus restricting the analysis to the determinants of country risk, as distinct from financial risk.5 Finally, the present study has considered a larger set of possible determinants of the probability of default than previous work.
In Section 2 of this paper a simple framework for analyzing the determinants of the (subjective) probability of default is presented. It is argued here that these determinants will basically depend on the nature of the present value of the expected cost of defaulting. From a modelling point of view, different assumptions regarding the specific form of this cost will yield different sets of determinants of this probability. In this section a specific example is presented, assuming that in a two periods world the cost of default can be represented as a fraction of the second period output (Sachs and Cohen, 1982 The principal distinction between a sovereign and a private borrower is that the former can repudiate its debt without (totally) losing control of the assets financed by it (see Buiter, 1980; Eaton and Gersowitz, 1980) . Generally, however, the repudiation of the foreign debt will result in some costs to the borrower. These costs can take several forms, including the country's complete exclusion from future borrowing in the international capital market,
The decision to repudiate the debt will depend both on the level of the debt and the cost of repudiating it. Broadly speaking, a country will repudiate its debt if its value exceeds the present value of the (expected) cost of repudiating it. Assuming that thIs cost (C) is a continuous nonnegative random variable, and denoting the value of the debt as D, the probability of default can be written as:
By a well known theorem it is possible to write (Mood, Graybill and Boes 1974, p. 71) :
where E(C) is the expected value of C. Then, considering (2) with an equality sign, the probability of default can be written as:
This expression has the following desirable properties: P/3D > 0;
aP/E(C) < 0; and lim p = 1. Also, recognizing the p has to be bounded by 0 and 1 (i.e., 0 p 1), we find that, lim P = 0.
Equation (3) is a very general expression that simply states that the determinants of the probability of default will depend on the initial value of the debt and on the nature of the cost of repudiating it. From a modelling perspective, different sets of determinants of this probability can be derived depending on the nature of the expected cost chosen. In that sense then, it is not surprising that Sachs and Cohen (1982) find that the probability of default will be a decreasiug function of the propensity to invest.6 The reason for this is that they assume that the cost of default is a function of future output which, on its turn, will depend on the present propensity to invest.
In order to further illustrate this point, assume that the expected cost of repudiating the debt can be expressed as a proportion a of the present value of output. Furthermore, in order to simplify the exposition assume that the case of a two period world where output in period 2 (q2) can be written as:
q2=q1+a111+a2n+X2 (4) where q1 is output in period 1; Ii is net investment in period 1; n is the rate of growth of the labor force; a1 and a2 are constant parameters;
and X2 is a random shock with mean i and variance ci2.7 Then, the present value of the expected cost of repudiating the debt is (where r is the interest rate on the debt):8 aE(q2) 1 E(C) = l+r = •n-{aq1 + aa111 + aa2n + ap} (5) and the probability of default p can be written as:
where f1 is the average propensity to invest in period 1 (f1 = 11/q1) and d1 is the debt-output ratio (a1 = D1/q1).
According to this expression then, if the cost of repudiating the debt is a fraction of future output, the probability of default will depend positively on the debt-output ratio d1, and negatively on the propensity to invest (f1) and the rate growth of population (a).
It can be further assumed that the cost of repudiating the debt will not be a constant function of future output, but that a will depend on some economic variables. In particular, it may be argued that a will depend positively on the level of internation reserves holdings. There are several ways to rationalize this assumption. On the one hand, an important proportion of international reserves are held in the form of financial instruments maintained in foreign banks which can easily be secured by the lender in case of default. Secondly, it may be assumed that the international financial community will impose harsher penalties on countries who, in spite of holding highly liquid reserves, decide to default on their debt. Then, if we include these considerations and denote the ratio of reserves to output by R, it is possible to postulate that the probability of default can be written as: p p( d, f, R, ...;13) (7) (+) (-) (-) where the signs in parentheses refer to the signs of the respective partial derivatives, and where captures other possible determinants of p not explicitly considered by the previous analysis. In Section 3 below data on over 700 Eurodollar loans granted between 1976 and 1980 to LDC's are used to investigate the extent to which some of these variables (i.e., d, f, and R), among others, affect the spread between the LIBOR rate and the interest rate actually charged on these loans.
Estimation
Assume that, as postulated by Feder and Just (l977a,b), Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) and Sachs (1981) among others, the spread (s) over LIBOR charged on Eurodollar loans reflects the probability of default (p) of a particular country. Then, observed data on the spread can be used to formally analyze the way in which variables like the debt-output ratio, the propensity to invest, and others affect the level of this perceived probability.
However, before empirically analyzing the determinants of the spread two important questions should be addressed: (1) What is the functional form of the probability of default (p); and (2) What is the exact form of the relationship between these two variables (s and p). A related question, that was partially answered in the previous section, has to do with the determinants of p.
Assuming that banks maximize the present value of profits, Feder and Just (l977a) developed a model where the spread (s) can be written in the following form:
for A = (/rj-i) 8; and where ii is the elasticity of demand for loans;
h is the expected loss in case of default; and 0 captures the cost of capital for the bank. Equation (8) is highly convenient for the empirical analysis, since by assuming that p has a logistic form it is possible to write the logarithm of the spread as a linear function of the determinants of p (Theil, 1971 ):
i=l where the X11s are the determinants of the probability of default (i.e., the debt-output ratio, the reserves-output ratio, the propensity to invest), and where the &s are the respective coefficients.
In this section the results obtained from the estimation of an equation of the type of (9) using data on 727 public and publically guaranteed loans granted to 19 LDC's during 1976-1980 are reported.
The Data
The analysis reported in this paper uses annual data for 19 LDC's, who A number of variables were considered as possible determinants of the level of the spread, including those suggested by the model presented in the preceding section. Specifically, the following variables were included as possibly affecting s n the empirical analysis:
(1)
The debt-output ratio. As the model developed in Section 2 indicates --and has been argued by Frank and Cline (1971) 
The ratio of debt service to exports. This indicator measures possible cash-flow problems faced by a particular country. This variable has been previously included by Frank and Cline (1971) and Feder and Just (l977a) in related studies, and it is expected that its coefficient will be positive. Data on this ratio was obtained from the World Debt Tables.
Ratio of international reserves to GNP. 
Loan duration. This variable is measured in years, and measures the (weighted) average maturity of loans granted to a particular country.
As has been shown by Feder and Ross (1982) its a priori sign in the regression analysis Is ambiguous. The weighted average was constructed from data reported in Borrowing in International Capital Markets and is presented in Table 1 .
Loan volume. This variable shows the average value of each loan obtained by a particular country in a given year, and was obtained from
Borrowing in International Capital Markets. Also, a priori, its sign is ambiguous.
Propensity to invest. This variable, previously considered by Sachs (1981) in his empirical study on the determinants of the spread, will tend to capture the country's perspectives for future growth. As is shown in Section 2, and in Sachs and Cohen (1982) , it will be negatively related to the level of the spread. This indicator was obtained from data reported in the World Tables and in World Development Report (various issues).
Ratio of the current account to CMI'. It has been argued by Sachs (1981) that this variable will be negatively related to the spread. The data on this variable was obtained from World Tables and various issues of the World Development Report.
Average propensity to import. This indicator was constructed as the ratio of imports to GNP, and measures the degree of openness of a country. To the extent that this ratio captures the degree vulnerability of a country to foreign shocks, it is expected that it will be positively related to the probability of default (Feder and Just, 1977a) . This variable was constructed from data obtained from the International Financial Statistics.
Growth of per capita GDP. It has been argued that a higher rate of growth of output will result in a lower probability of default (see Avramovic, et al., 1964; Feder and Just, 1977a Other variables were also considered as possible determinants of the probability of default, including GNP per capita (Feder and Just, l977a), the rate of inflation (McDonald, 1982) , the variability of exports (Frank and Cline, 1970) , and the ratio of government expenditure to GNP. However, due to space considerations, and since their inclusion did not affect the results in any significant way, the estimates obtained when they were included are not reported here.
Results
Equation (9) was estimated using pooled cross-section time-series data for 19 countries during five years (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) . For a list of the countries see Table 3 . For estimation purposes it was assumed that log Ant was equal to a constant k plus a random element TJ (log Ant = k -ut). The results presented in this paper were obtained using the technique suggested by Fuller and Batesse (1974) for estimating this kind of equation.
In the estimation ( + k) was combined into a constant 8.
One possible problem with the estimation of (10) is that, to the extent that banks determine the spread and loan duration at the same time, use of Fuller-Batesse's technique would be subject to a simultaneity bias. However, following Feder and Ross (1982) , and Beim (1977) it was assumed that the duration of the loan is determined by banks prior to the determination of the spread. This indeed appears to be the case in the Eurocurrency credit itiarkets (see Euromoney, September 1978). Table 2 contains the results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) using Fuller-Batesse's technique.'1 These results are quite satisfactory, both from the point of view of the mean square errors of the regressions, and from the perspective of the signs and level of significance of the coefficients.12 Broadly speaking, the empirical evidence shows that international lending behavior to LDC's tends to take into account some of the economic characteristics of the specific borrowing countries. As may be seen, in all regressions the debt-output ratio is significantly positive, and smaller than one. This result suggests that a higher level of indebtedness will be associated with a higher probability of default and thus, a higher spread over LIBOR, With respect to the debt-service ratio, its coefficients are also positive, as expected, and significant either at the 5 or 10 percent level.
One of the most interesting findings of this analysis is that the coefficient of the reserves to GNP ratio is consistently negative, as expected, and with the exception of equation (10.3) it is always significant at the 5% level. Also, the estimated values of these coefficients are high, indicating that the behavior of the reserves ratio has played an important role in the determination of the perceived probability of default. The main importance of thIs result is that, from a policy point of view, countries that want to reduce the probbility o being excluded from the International financial market due to an increase in the perceived probability of default, should be particularly careful in managing their international reserves.
Also, these results suggest that the analysis of the demand for international reserves should incorporate the level of foreign indebtedness as an additional determinant of the desired level of international liquidity. It is also interesting to note that coefficient of the reserves ratio is quite high in absolute terms, exceeding in all cases the estimated value of the coefficient of the debt to GNP ratio.
The coefficients of loan duration and loan value are negative, but insigificant, as are the coefficients of the imports-output ratio and growth. In all regressions the estimated coefficient of the gross investment/GNP ratio was negative, as expected. Also in all cases, except in equation (10.3), it was significant, indicating that, as the model in Section 2 suggests, a higher propensity to invest reflects higher expected output in the future, and as a consequence a lower perceived probability of default.
The coefficients of the current account ratio is positive in the two regressions where it was included (10.1) and (10.3), being significant in only one of the cases. This is a somewhat puzzling result, since it indicates that a lower deficit (or higher surplus) will result in a higher and perceived probability of default and spread. The problem with this is that, with other things given --especially the investment ratio -a higher current account deficit means that the same investment is being financed with a higher proportion of foreign savings, and one would generally expect that in this case (i.e., lower domestic savings ratio) the perceived probability of default would be higher.
It is interesting to note that in all cases the estImated variance of the time-specific element exceeds the estimated countryspecific variance indicating that during the period under consideration differences across time in the country risk premium were more important than differences across country. This result is capturing the fact that throughout the period under consideration (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) ) the level of world liquidity varied significantly.
On the whole, however, the low value of the mean square error of the regressions (MSE) show a quite satisfactory fit.
From the results presented In Table 2 it would be interesting to investigate how the perceived probability of default will be affected if a country increases its foreign debt to finance the accumulation of international reserves.'3 In order to answer this question it is important to realize that in this case, three right hand side variables from our default risk equation (10) wIll be affected: (1) the debt/GNP ratio will increase, tending to raise the spread; (2) the international reserves/GNp ratio will rise, exercising a downward pressure on the spread, since its estimated coefficient is negative; and (3) the debt service/exports ratio will also go up, generating additional positive pressure on the spread. The final effect of this policy, aimed at financing the accumulation of reserves with new foreign debt, on the spread will depend on the sum of these three effects, and can be written in the following form:
where a1, a2 and a3 are the estimated regression coefficients of the debt/GNP, reserves/GNP and debt service/exports ratios respectively; y is the fraction of the debt's principal that has to be amortized every year (i.e., one over the duration of the debt); I is the interest rate actually charged (LIBOR plus the spread); XR is the exports/GNP ratio; and DR is the debt/GNP ratio. In order to illustrate the total impact of this policy, on the spread, consider the case where y = 0.125 (i.e., the duration of the loan in 8 years), i = 0.12 and XR = 0.225. The expression in square brackets in (10) will have a value of -0.069 for the a's obtained from equation (10.1) in Table 2 ; a value of -0.050 for the a's obtained from equation ( For all practical purposes, then, the results presented in Table 2 indicate that an increase in the foreign indebtedness ratio by 10%, coupled with an increase of the international reserves ratio by 10% will tend to leave the spread (and the perceived probability of default) unaffected. This could be considered to be somewhat surprising, since international reserves are a short-term highly volatile asset, which can be equickly depleted, while foreign debt is a long term liability. (This case corresponds closely to the recent experiences of Argentina and Chile.)
Summarizing, the evidence presented in this section shows that during the recent past, lending behavior by international banks in Eurocurrency markets has taken into account (some of) the economic characteristics of borrowers.
Even though some of the coefficients were sensitive to the specification of the estimated equations, the general results tend to be consistent with what was expected.
The Perceived Probabilities of Default
The econometric estimates reported in Table 2 can be used to compute the estimated banks' perceived probabilities of default as:
l+exp{ + aX } on in nti where = -k is the imputed value for a0 in equation (9) (for t the estimated value of the constant in the regression analysis).'5 Table 3 presents estimated probabilities of default for each year obtained from equation (10.1) under the assumption that k equals 2.50. these probabilities can be observed. First, it can be seen that, within each year, there is a fairly wide variation in the perceived probability across countries. For example, the results in Table 3 show that in 1976, p ranges from a lower value of 5.9% (Venezuela) to 10.6% (Uruguay). Second, for each country, these probabilities of default show some variation through time. For example, for the case of Ecuador the probability increases steadily between 1976 and 1979. On the other hand, for the case of Brazil, one of the countries that eventually ran into serious foreign debt problems, there is an increase in the perceived probability of default of approximately one full percentage point. Surprisingly, however, Argentina's probability declined throughout the period.
The computations presented in Tables 3 and 4 Source: IMF not to minimize the role of domestic policies. In particular, the fact that in most cases a large proportion of the new indebtedness was used to finance consumption should be pointed out (see Kindleberger, 1977 
Residuals Analysis and Other Possible Determinants of Country Risk
The analysis presented in the preceding sections has focused exclusively on the economic determinants of the premium over Libor charged by the financial community to sovereign borrowers. However, it is highly likely that this premium is also affected by the lenders perception of political Stability in a particular country (see, for example, Buiter, 1980) . In order to investigate this possibility the residuals from the regressions were analyzed, and an average (for 1976-1980 ) residual for each country was computed.
where 5nt is the spread actually charged in period t to country n, and where z LS Xth is the estimated log of the spread using Fuller-Batesse's GLS procedure. Then, a positive value of RES will indicate that, on average, the spread being charged to that particular country exceeds the model's prediction. If the residuals are capturing the effect of omitted variables related to political stability, countries with positive RES should be considered as being politically more risky than the average. In general, however, they don't seem to provide an obvious ordering of countries, according to a priori This paper has analyzed the relationship between foreign debt and default country risk. The analysis presented suggests that, the probability of default will depend on the relationship between the cost of defaulting and the value of the debt. Once a particular function for the cost of default has been chosen, the determinants of the country risk can be easily found.
The empirical analysis has used data on 727 public and publically guaranteed loans granted to 19 LDCs during 1976 and 1980. The result obtained suggest that banks lending behavior has tended to consider (some of) the economic characteristics of countries when determining the spread they charge. However, the results also suggest that, at least during this period, banks might have overlooked some aspects of the developing countries'
economies. In particular, the finding of a large negative value for the coefficient of the international reserves ratio suggests that banks might have given excessive weight to this value ifl their lending decisions.
Footnotes
'See, for example, Time (January 10, 1983), The Economist, (5-11 March 1983), Martin Feldstein (1983) , Folkerts-Landau (1982) . The indebtedness situation is particularly critical regarding Latin American debtors. For example, U.S. private banks have "extended credit of more than U.S. $50 billion to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, an amount that exceeds 80 percent of the banks equity" (Feldstein, 1983, p. 2) . The extent of the indebtedness crisis is reflected by the fact that in 1982 twenty countries undertook debt renegotiations, while in the second half of the l970s an average of only 4 countries per year renegotiated their debts.
2See, for example, Harberger (1976 Harberger ( , 1980 . 3See McDonald (1982) for an excellent and exhaustive survey on the subject. See also the analysis in Buiter (1980) . 4From a historical perspective, it is interesting to notice that in the recent time the number of defaults have been dramatically reduced, with the number of debt rescheduling increasing substantially. For a historical analysis of LDCs debt rescheduling and defaults, see Sachs (1982) .
51n a previous paper (Edwards, 1981) I used data that included both publicly guaranteed and private loans. Using data for the second quarter of 1980 it was found that the government guarantee resulted, on average, in a reduction of the spread of one quarter of a percentage point.
6This is only true in their case "without" renegotiation.
71t is useful to think of equation (4) as being derived from a CobbDouglas aggregate production function.
81n (5) the interest rate on the debt (r) was used to compute the present value of the expected cost of repudiation. More generally, however, the domestic rate of time preference (p) should be used. In (5), then, it is implicitly assumed that r = p. [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . It is important to note that these averages were constructed using data on publicized loans only. To the extent that, on average, the characteristics of non-publicized loans do not differ from that of publicized, the results will not be affected.
'°In pooled time-series cross-section analysis it is usually assumed that the error term has this form. For detailed discussions see Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Nerlove (1971) . In the present case it is possible to think that the country-specific term v will capture some characteristics specific to each country, while the time-specific element (wt) will capture, among other things, different liquidity situations in the market in every year. Equation (9) was also estimated assuming fixed-effect country-specific and timespecific terms. The results obtained, however, did not alter in a significant way those reported in Table 2. 11Also, in the analysis presented in this paper, as in previous work (i.e., Feder and Just l977a,b; Sachs 1981; and Feder and Ross 1982) , the possible role of fees and commissions has not been incorporated.
2These results were obtained using contemporaneous values of the spread determinants (as in Feder and Just, 1977b) . Sachs (1981) , however, used lagged values of the spread determinants. When lagged values of these variables are used in the estimation of (10) some of the results reported in Table 2 (i.e., the levels of significance) are affected.
'3A recent case where this type of policy was deliberately persued is Chile 1979 Chile -1981 . During this period the increase in the level of foreign debt was used almost in a one-to-one basis to accumulate international reserves.
See, for example, Harberger (1982) and Edwards (1983) .
14These are reasonable values for these parameters. As may be seen from 15me reason for the presence of in (12) Is that in order to estimate the perceived probability of default we need estimated values for all the a's from equation (9) '8One possibility is that these residuals are capturing the fact that some of these countries are oil-producers. However, when a dummy for oilproducing countries was included its coefficient was insignificant, and the main results were not affected.
